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Abstract
Altruism drives many economic decisions. We explore the implications of altruistic
preferences for the organization of family rms. Adapting Aghion and Tirole (1997),
we compare the allocation of decision-making rights in family and non-family rms.
The distinguishing feature of a family rm is that the principal is altruistic towards
the blood-related agent. Taking participation of the agent as given, we characterize
sucient conditions for centralization in both non-family and family rms. We
then consider the agent's choice of where to work. When the principal chooses
the allocation of decision-making rights and the agent chooses where they work,
centralization occurs in a broader range of circumstances in family rms than in non-
family rms, consistent with empirical evidence. We also show that: an agent might
choose to remain working at a decentralized family rm, even though they would
prefer decision making to be centralized; and an agent might choose to remain in a
centralized family rm, even when it does not undertake the type of work preferred
by the agent. We relate our ndings to the relative performance of family versus
non-family rms, and to issues of succession.
Key words: decision-making rights, decentralization, family ownership, altruism.
JEL classications: D23, L23, L29.
1 Introduction
Family-owned businesses are one of the most prevalent types of rm around the world
(La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002) and Anderson and Reeb (2003)). Given
their importance, however, family rms are relatively understudied. The prevailing
theme in the literature is that family rms are dierent. One stream of research focuses
on agency issues in family rms; for example, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest family
ownership can help alleviate agency problems by avoiding the separation of ownership
and control. In a similar vein, other authors suggest that family owners are less impa-
tient, encouraging longer-term investment, and that family members can have a broader
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range of methods by which they can transfer utility between each other, again creating
an environment capable of supporting higher levels of investment than would be possible
otherwise.1 Some empirical studies focus on the relative performance of family rms,
with some researchers arguing that: family rms perform better (Sraer and Thesmar,
2007); family-owned rms perform relatively poorly (Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008); or
that, nally, there is no direct link between ownership type and performance (Miller
et al., 2007). Another line of literature focuses on the potential problems relating to suc-
cession between generations in family-owned rms (Bennedsen et al., 2007 and Cucculelli
and Micucci, 2008).2
We address two connected, but as yet unresolved issues, both related to the organi-
zational structure of family rms. First, we consider the allocation of decision-making
rights within a family rm. Empirical evidence, such as Bloom and Van Reenen (2010),
suggests that decision making is more centralized in family rms than non-family owned
rms. Similarly, Wait and Wright (2010) nd that major decisions are more likely to be
centralized in family-owned rms, as compared to their non-family counterparts. Deci-
sion making is a critical element in the operation of a rm, and their decision-making
protocols are dierent, which could at least partially explain the observed dierences
between family and non-family rms.
Second, we endogenize the participation in family rms. The prevalence of family
rms is due, in part, to children's (and spouses') willingness to work in the family
business. This is a complementary question to the issue of succession addressed by
Bennedsen et al. (2007) and Cucculelli and Micucci (2008). In many situations, the
choice to participate in a family rm is a forerunner to any issues relating to succession.
To address these questions, we develop a project-selection model based on the formal-
and real-authority framework of Aghion and Tirole (1997). In the model, outlined in
Section 2, the principal rst decides whether to retain or delegate to the agent the
authority to choose which of several projects to implement. After the decision-making
rights have been allocated, the decision maker can put in eort to become informed about
the payos of the potential projects. Upon implementation, a project can benet the
principal, the agent, or both; however, there is a potential conict of interest between the
two parties about which project is best. While there are the usual potential dierences
in preferences, we augment the standard model to include one-way altruism from the
parent principal towards the blood-related agent, typically their child. Parents (usually)
care for their children, so it seems natural that a father or mother who is a principal in
a family rm would care about the wellbeing (or payo) of the child-agent. However,
1James (1999) suggests that by not separating ownership and control, family ownership has the
advantage of lengthening the time horizon of investors. On the other hand, Schulze et al. (2002) argue
that while family ties can overcome some agency problems, they also create other issues, particularly
as the rm matures. In their empirical investigation, Anderson et al. (2012) found family-owned rms
make less short-term investments and that family rms prefer physical capital investments as opposed to
riskier R&D projects. Bandiera et al. (2009) nd that family-owned rms use less sensitive managerial
incentive contracts than their non-family counterparts.
2Survey evidence suggests that issues surrounding succession are one of the major concerns of family-
business owners (Chua et al., 2003).
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following Becker (1974), Schulze et al. (2002) and James (1999), amongst others, we
assume that this altruism is not reciprocated by the agent. Hence in our model, the
principal's utility depends in part upon the payo to the agent, but not vice versa. In
our model, this parental altruism is the key dierence between non-family and family
rms, and hence the driver of our predictions relating to the observed organizational
structures in family businesses.
The results of the model are discussed in Sections 3 and 4. First, we consider the
diering incentives to invest in information gathering in a family and non-family rm.
In a centralized family rm, the eort of the principal is higher than in an equivalent
non-family rm. This is because the principal has an additional benet from eort due
to their altruistic preferences towards the blood-related agent. However, an agent in a
decentralized rm exerts the same amount of eort, whether they work in a family or
non-family rm.
Second, we compare the principal's choice of decentralized decision-making structure
under the dierent forms of ownership. To do so we initially consider an exogenous rm
structure, in which participation in the rm by the principal and blood-relative agent
is given. Exogenous participation might reect strong expectations or cultural norms
regarding a child's family responsibilities. With exogenous participation in the rm, we
derive sucient conditions for family rms to be more likely to be centralized than non-
family rms; a higher rate of centralization in family rms requires that both the agent
and the principal prefer centralization, and that the principal be suciently altruistic.
But why would anyone want to work with their parents? We next extend the Aghion
and Tirole (1997) framework to allow for endogenous participation by the agent. In
particular, we examine the case when the agent can choose where they work (that is,
whether they elect to work in a family rm or elsewhere) and, following the employment
match, the principal decides the allocation of decision-making rights. In this framework,
a particular rm structure (family owned or otherwise) can only exist if it arises from the
equilibrium choices of both the agent and the principal. With endogenous participation
of the agent, we nd that centralization of decision-making occurs for a broader range
of parameters for family businesses than in non-family rms.
Our framework also leads to several somewhat perverse implications, which are con-
sistent with empirical observations. We nd that an agent could choose to remain in a
family-owned rm, even when they do not like the way things are done (Section 4.2).
Specically, an agent might opt to stay in decentralized family rm, even when they
would prefer decision making to be centralized. While staying in the family rm is still
their best option, the agent could well complain about being given too much responsibil-
ity. We also consider the case when an agent is able to choose the type of work they do
{ that is, by choosing how closely aligned their interests are with those of the principal
{ if they go and work in a non-family rm. It is possible that an agent will remain in a
centralized family rm that is not doing the type of work the agent prefers. The agent
remains in the family rm to reap the benets of the centralized decision making of their
altruistic principal, rather than work in a non-family rm in an area that they like more.
Again, the agent stays with the family business, but could complain about what the
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family business actually does. From this insight, our model also suggests that succession
between the generations in family rms can be problematic, given that an agent might
be only willing to stay in a centralized family rm whose business they are not particu-
larly interested because of the benet they receive from decisions made by an altruistic
principal. Our model also accords with the observation that the style of management in
a family rm changes upon succession; while the rst-generation of a family business is
often `paternalistic' and centralized, the second generation family businesses are often
more professionally managed, as well as making greater use of outside managers (see
Soneld and Lussier, 2004 and Dyer Jr., 1988). Section 5 concludes the paper, noting
the implications of our ndings and possibilities for future research.
This paper draws on several streams of literature, not least the theoretical models
of the optimal allocation of decision-making power in an organization. Some explana-
tions for the allocation of decision-making authority include a means of avoiding costly
communication Dessein (2002) and more eective information processing (Radner, 1993,
Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994, Van Zandt, 1999 and Meagher, 2003). Our approach,
following Aghion and Tirole (1997), considers the delegation of authority to involve a
tradeo between providing incentives to invest eort in obtaining essential information
versus a loss of control. Other authors have adopted a similar approach, including
Acemoglu et al. (2007), Zabojnik (2002) and Bester (2004). In this way, we focus on
agency issues both within family and non-family organization; parental altruism poten-
tially ameliorates but does not diminish agency. In addition, the empirical literature on
family rms is the motivator for this study. As noted above, centralized decision mak-
ing (Wait and Wright, 2010), poorer quality of management (Bloom et al., 2012) and
issues of generational succession (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, Bennedsen et al., 2007 and
Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008) are all associated with family-owned rms. Our model
suggests that parental altruism could be a contributing factor to all three issues.
2 Theoretical framework
Following Aghion and Tirole (1997), we model a hierarchy consisting of a principal and
an agent that can undertake one (or none) of N  3 possible projects. Each project
n 2 f1; :::; Ng, if chosen, yields a return of xp;n for the principal and a private benet
xa;n for the agent. The agent's preferred project (that is, the project that maximizes
the agent's private benet) yields xa for the agent and an expected return of pxp for
the principal; likewise, the principal's preferred project yields xp for the principal and
an expected benet of axa for the agent, where p; a 2 [0; 1].3 If no project is chosen,
the payo for both the principal and the agent is zero. We assume that redistribution
of ex post surplus between the parties is non-contractible.
3We refer to p and a as `congruence parameters'. The congruence parameters can be interpreted
in a number of ways, including as the probability that one party's preferred project also yields the
maximum payo for the other party (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) or as a measure of trust between the
parties (Marin and Verdier, 2008). For now, we adopt the more general interpretation that p and a
measure how closely the principal's interests are aligned with those of the agent, and vice versa.
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At the outset, neither the principal nor the agent knows the payos associated with
any of the potential projects. However, there is at least one project that yields a su-
ciently negative return for both parties so that neither will select a project at random if
uninformed.
Sequence of events.| In Period 1, the principal chooses the structure of the rm
in that she either retains decision-making authority (centralization) or she delegates it
to the agent (decentralization). In Period 2, the party with authority (party i, where
i 2 fp; ag) can search for information about the projects. Specically, at private eort
cost c(ei) party i learns the payos of all projects with probability ei, in which case they
implement their preferred project. We assume the eort cost function is increasing and
convex and that c0(1)!1. Thus, party i's net payo is:
Ui = eixi   c(ei)
for i 2 fp; ag. The payo of the party without the decision-making authority is:
Uj = eijxj
for j 2 fp; ag, j 6= i.
2.1 The non-family business
Decentralization.| If the rm is decentralized (i = a and j = p), the payos for each
party are:
UDp = eapxp (1)
and
UDa = eaxa   c(ea): (2)
Given the allocation of decision-making authority, in the second period, the agent chooses
ea so as to maximizes his expected payo in (2). The rst-order condition is xa = c
0(ea),
which given our assumptions yields an interior solution ea. Thus, the equilibrium payos
to each party are:
UDp = e

apxp (3)
UDa = e

axa   c(ea) (4)
Centralization.| If decision-making power is centralized (i = p and j = a), each
party's payo is:
UCp = epxp   c(ep); (5)
and
UCa = epaxa: (6)
The principal's rst-order condition from (5) is xp = c
0(ep); let the solution be ep. This
yields anticipated payos from centralization of:
UCp = e

pxp   c(ep) (7)
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and
UCa = e

paxa: (8)
2.2 The family business
In contrast to other businesses, the family rm is typied by ties between its members
that extend beyond a purely commercial relationship. According to Ward (1987), \the
very nature of business often seems to contradict the nature of the family. Families
tend to be emotional; businesses are objective. Families are protective of their members,
businesses, much less so". In this spirit, and following the approach of Becker (1981) and
Chami (2001), we model the dierence between family and non-family rms as being
the presence or absence of altruism between the parties. Specically, we assume that
family rms are characterized by asymmetric altruism, whereby the principal cares not
only about her own payo but also that of the agent (but not vice versa); thus, the
principal's utility function now takes the form:
V kp =
1
1 + 
(Ukp ) +

1 + 
(Uka )
where k 2 fC;Dg and  2 (0; 1].
Because the agent is not altruistic towards the principal, his utility function remains
unchanged:
V ka = U
k
a
where k 2 fC;Dg. This accords with rotten-kid model of Becker (1974), in which a par-
ent (in our model the principal) cares for the wellbeing of their selsh child (the agent),
but not vice versa. An alternative rationale for this one-sided altruism comes from the
evolutionary literature; a person's altruistic preferences towards another individual de-
pends on how related the two are. As children have more fertile years ahead of them,
parents will display more altruism towards their children than vice versa.4 As discussed
further in Section 3.1, our one-sided altruism assumption can be seen as an approxima-
tion of the parent-principal being relatively more altruistic than their child-agent.
Decentralization.| As there is no change in the agent's utility function, his optimal
eort under decentralization is still given by ea, and his utility is unchanged from what it
would be in a non-family rm. Given her altruism, the principal's utility is dierent. The
expected payo in a decentralized family rm to the principal and the agent, respectively,
are
V Dp =
1
1 + 
(eapxp) +

1 + 
(eaxa   c(ea)) (9)
and
V Ap = e

axa   c(ea): (10)
4See, for example, Hamilton (1964a) and Hamilton (1964b) for more details on what is often referred
to as Hamilton's Rule.
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Centralization.| In a centralized family rm, the principal's utility function is now
given by:
V Cp  V Cp =
1
1 + 
(epxp   c(ep)) + 
1 + 
(epaxa): (11)
Note that, because the principal's utility now depends on both xp;n and xa;n, the project
that maximizes her utility is not necessarily the project that maximizes her private
benet, xp;n. That is, it is possible that in the presence of altruism the principal will
choose to implement a third project (other than the project that maximizes her private
benet or the project that maximizes the agent's private benet). Furthermore, even
though the redistribution of ex post surplus is non-contractible, it is possible that the
principal will voluntarily make a (monetary) transfer to the agent if the increase in
the agent's private benet thereby increases the principal's utility overall.5 For these
reasons, it is possible that the principal's level of utility exceeds that level associated
with xp. Likewise, since the increase in the principal's utility depends on her altruism
towards the agent, it follows that he must also benet from the choice of alternative
project or the redistribution of ex post surplus.
However, in the case where xp does maximize the principal's utility, (that is, where
V Cp = V
C
p ), her optimal level of eort is given by the rst-order condition:
xp + axa = c
0(ep):
Again, we assume that there is an interior solution, ep , which yields payos:
V Cp  V Cp =
1
1 + 
 
ep xp   c(ep )

+

1 + 
(ep axa) (12)
and
V Ca  V Ca = ep axa: (13)
Because the cost function is increasing and convex, the principal's choice of eort
is higher in the presence of altruism (ep > ep); for this reason, the agent's expected
private benet is higher in a centralized family than a non-family rm with centralized
decision making. Indeed, the optimal level of eort is increasing in , a and xa, which
implies that the principal's choice of eort is higher when she is more altruistic and/or
when the agent derives greater benet from the increased eort. On the other hand, due
assumptions about the form of altruism, it is not clear whether a principal in a family
rm is better o than a principal in a non-family rm if the rm is centralized. Result 1
summarizes this discussion.
Result 1. While the agent's eort is the same in both a decentralized family and non-
family rm, the principal's eort in a family rm is higher than the eort of a principal
in a non-family rm. The eort of the principal in a family rm is increasing in her
altruism and the expected benet to the agent.
5Clearly, this is not an issue if xp and xa are linear in income/wealth; however, in the more general
case it is, in principle, possible that a principal may wish to centralize decision making and, following
the choice of project, `compensate' the agent with a transfer.
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2.3 Empirical predictions
Several empirical predictions about the nancial performance of family rms arise from
this analysis. From Result 1, the principal of a centralized family rm exerts higher eort
than her non-family rm counterpart. This increases the probability that she becomes
informed and is able to implement a project, thus increasing expected returns (epxp).
If costs of eort are borne privately and are not reected in nancial data, we would
expect this to translate to an increase in reported nancial returns and/or protability.
This possibly explains empirical ndings of higher returns in family rms (Sraer and
Thesmar, 2007).
On the other hand, we have also noted that project choice by an informed principal
in a family rm is potentially skewed by the presence of altruism. This accords with nd-
ings that investment decisions in family rms dier from their non-family counterparts
(Anderson et al., 2012). By selecting a dierent project, the principal elects to forgo
some of her own private benet in order to increase the agent's private benet, in order
to raise her utility overall. As discussed above, the principal may also make voluntary
monetary transfers to the agent for the same reason. Such redistribution occurs at the
expense of the principal's private benet, which may translate to lower nancial returns.
This may explain the the empirical analyses of Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) and Bloom
et al. (2012), who nd that family rms are less protable than non-family rms. In
our model, the family-rm principal is more than compensated because she is altruistic
towards the agent; however, the psychic utility of altruism is unlikely to be reected in
nancial data.
To the extent that market returns are related to eort, however, our model suggests
that a decentralized family-owned rm will have the same market return, and invest-
ment strategy, as a non-family rms. It is also possible that family rms dier in their
observed nancial performance because of their dierent choice of decision-making allo-
cation (for example, choosing a centralized structure when a non-family rm would have
decentralized decision-making rights). This discussion is summarized in the following
empirical prediction.
Prediction 1. Family rms can dier in their nancial returns to non-family rms due
to: a potentially dierent choice of decision-making allocation; and from altered eort
and project choice by the principal when decision making is centralized.
This empirical prediction provides a guide for future empirical research relating to
the dierences in nancial returns in family and non-family rms, suggesting a nuanced
relationship between dierences in the internal organizational structure of rms and
their observed nancial performance.
3 To centralize or decentralize?
The allocation of decision-making rights is one of the key choices a rm has to make.
In this section we consider the preferences of the principal and the agent regarding who
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should be granted decision-making authority. While the decision maker has the distinct
advantage that they get to choose their favorite project, along with authority comes the
eort cost of trying to be informed. The added complication in our model is that the
principal's altruism alters the relative advantage of being the decision maker for both
parties.
3.1 Principal's choice of rm structure
Now suppose, in Period 1, it is the principal who decides whether decision making is
centralized or decentralized. Thus, in a non-family rm, the principal will choose to
centralize if and only if UCp > U
D
p , that is:
p <
epxp   c(ep)
eaxp
 ^NFp :
By contrast, in a family rm, a sucient but not necessary condition for centralization
is V Cp > V
D
p , which implies that:
p <
ep xp   c(ep ) + 

(ep axa)  (eaxa   c(ea))

eaxp
 ^Fp :
Figure (1) depicts the principal's payo under dierent organizational structures
(family and non-family; centralized and decentralized) for values of p. From the graph,
the principal of a family or a non-family rm will prefer to decentralize when her inter-
ests are closely aligned with those of the agent (p is relatively high) and to centralize
otherwise; when p is low the loss to the principal from allowing the agent to make
decisions in his own interests is greater. It should be noted, however, that the necessary
and sucient condition for centralization in a family rm is V Cp > V
D
p . From equation
(12), it is clear that the V Cp curve lies at least as high as V
C
p . It is therefore possible
that the threshold for decentralization in a family rm is even higher than ^Fp .
Centralization is the principal's optimal choice for a wider range of congruence pa-
rameter values in a family rm if ^NFp < ^
F
p , or if:


(ep axa)  (eaxa   c(ea))

> [epxp   c(ep)]  [ep xp   c(ep )]: (14)
From this equation, it is possible to derive conditions for increased rates of centraliza-
tion in family rms. The right-hand side of the equation represents the dierence between
the principal's private payo in a non-family rm and in a family rm { in other words,
the loss of private benet arising from increased eort in the family rm. Note that the
right-hand side must be positive as, by construction, ep maximizes UCp = epxp c(ep). On
the left-hand side, the expression in the square brackets denotes the dierence between
the agent's payo from centralization and from decentralization in a family rm { that
is, it measures the agent's preference for centralization. Therefore, in order for equation
(14) to be satised, it must be the case that: (a) the agent in the family rm prefers
centralization over decentralization; and (b) the principal's level of altruism towards the
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Figure 1: Principal's payo under dierent organizational structures for xp = xa = 1, a = 0:5
and  = 0:5.
agent is suciently high, such that the utility derived via altruism outweighs the loss of
private benet incurred from increased eort. Result 2 summarizes this discussion.
Result 2. With exogenous participation, centralized decision-making authority is more
likely in a family-owned rm when the agent in a family rm prefers centralization and
the principal is relatively altruistic.
Finally, it is worth reconsidering our one-sided altruism assumption. One might
anticipate that a child-agent in a family rm might be altruistic towards the parent-
principal. These preferences would also encourage the agent to put in more eort with
decentralization than otherwise. However, the choice of the allocation of decision-making
authority will depend on the relative strength of the altruism of the principal as compared
with the agent, as well as the other parameters in model. Provided the principal is
relatively more altruistic than the agent, the principal's incentive to centralize decision
making, and the agent's willingness to accept it, will continue to hold.
3.2 Agent's preference of rm structure
Noting that the principal's choice of rm structure depends in part on the agent's pref-
erences, we now turn to the question as to when an agent will prefer centralization to
decentralization. In a non-family rm, this will occur when UCa > U
D
a , or:
a >
eaxa   c(ea)
epxa
 ^NFa : (15)
In a family rm, a sucient but not necessary condition for centralization is V Ca > V
D
a ,
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which can be written as:
a >
eaxa   c(ea)
ep xa
 ^Fa : (16)
The agent's payo under dierent organization structures is depicted in Figure (2).
Now, it can be seen that the agent prefers centralization when her congruence parameter
(a) is relatively high, and decentralization when it is relatively low. Again, this suggests
that a party will prefer to hold the power to make decisions when their interest is not
suciently aligned with that of the other party. Because ep > ep, it must be the case
that ^NFa > ^
F
a , such that the agent prefers centralization for a wider range of parameter
values in the family rm than in the non-family rm { an agent tolerates centralization
for a greater range of a given the principal's altruism. This result is reinforced once
it is recognized that, from (13), the V Ca curve lies at least as high as V
C
a , making the
threshold for centralization in a family rm possibly lower than ^Fa . This discussion is
summarized in the result below.
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Figure 2: Agent's payo under dierent organizational structures for xp = xa = 1, p = 0:5 and
 = 0:5.
Result 3. An agent in a family rm is more likely to prefer centralized decision making
than an agent in a non-family rm.
4 Participation in family rms
In practice, not all family members are involved in the family business. For this reason,
we now turn to the question of whether or not an individual will choose to work in a
family rm. In particular, we now suppose that an agent in a family rm has outside
option of working in a non-family rm, and that an agent who is not working in a family
rm can choose amongst a large number of rms (both centralized and decentralized).
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Formally, let there now be a period prior to Period 1 (Period 0) in which the agent
chooses an employer. We assume that, at this stage, the agent can perfectly observe the
value of p associated with his matching with each prospective principal and can there-
fore anticipate the principal's decision in relation to centralization or decentralization
in Period 1. For each agent, let there be a large number of rms dierentiated by p
and at most one family rm from which he can choose. To avoid issues of matching, we
assume that the agent holds all the bargaining power in relation to the formation of an
employment contract { that is to say, the agent can work for whomever he likes. For
now, we assume that a, xa and xp are constant between each of the agent's options,
to exclude the possibility that the agent's choice is driven by a better alignment of his
interest with the rm's or by dierences in the parties' payos.6
Essentially, this translates to a mechanism by which an agent can leave one rm for
another if the latter has (or, more precisely, will have) an organizational structure that
is more benecial to the agent. Importantly, the eect of p is binary, in the sense that
if it is below the critical level the principal will choose to centralize and if it is above
the critical level the principal will choose to decentralize; in most cases, small changes
in p have no marginal eect on the utility of the agent. Therefore, the agent cares only
about where p lies in relation to the critical threshold.
Thus, in Figure (2), an agent in a decentralized non-family rm will leave that
business in Period 0 in favor of a centralized rm if a > ^
NF
a ; conversely, he will
leave a centralized non-family rm in favor of a decentralized non-family rm if a <
^NFa . Similarly, an agent in a family rm will leave the decentralized rm in favor of a
centralized non-family rm if a > ^
NF
a ; however, he will only leave a centralized family
rm in favor of a decentralized non-family rm if a < ^
F
a . Because ^
F
a < ^
NF
a , it
follows that agents will leave centralized rms for a smaller range of a in family rms
than in non-family rms. Thus, the payo of an agent initially in a centralized family
rm now follows the curve ABC for dierent levels of a, whereas the payo of an agent
initially in a non-family or decentralized family rm follows ADE.
4.1 Centralization in family rms
We now consider the joint outcome of the agent's choice of where to work when he takes
into account the principal's allocation of decision-making authority.
Figure (3) represents the preferences of the principal and the agent over dierent
values of p and a for xp = xa:
7 In a non-family rm, the principal prefers to centralize
in the region FGHIJ . As observed above, this preference depends only on her congru-
ence parameter. By contrast, in a family rm, the principal preference for centralization
depends in both parameters; the principal prefers centralization in EGIJC. From Fig-
ure (3), it is not clear whether the principal prefers centralization for a greater range of
parameter values in the family or the non-family rm (i.e. whether EC > FH), in the
absence of dening a specic cost function.
6This issue is addressed below in section 4.2.
7Setting xp = xa excludes the possibility that preferences for certain organizational structures are
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Figure 3: Preferences of the principal and agent for xp = xa. The principal prefers decentraliza-
tion above ^p, whereas the agent prefers decentralization to the left of ^a.
However, because the agent always has the outside option of going to work for a
decentralized non-family rm, centralized rms will not exist in some of the regions
specied above. Indeed, a centralized rm will exist if and only if both parties prefer
centralization. Thus, in a non-family rm, the agent will opt out if he nds himself in
the region FGHI (when the principal prefers centralization, but he does not), and will
instead seek employment with a decentralized (non-family) rm in the region ABC.8
Similarly, the agent will leave a centralized family rm in the region G in favor of a
decentralized non-family rm in the region A. Consequently, because rms require both
employers and employees, centralized rms will only exist in the region J and CEIJ
for non-family and family rms respectively; from this, it is clear that centralization
be sustained by a greater range of parameter values in a family than in a non-family
context. The discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. With endogenous participation by the agent and when the potential
benet of the project is the same to both parties, centralization is supported by a broader
range of parameters in a family-owned rm than in a non-family rm.
Proof See appendix. 
driven by dierences in the parties' payos.
8Recall that, for a given value of a, the agent is indierent between all values of p in the region
ABC, since any value of p in this region will induce the principal to choose decentralization.
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4.2 Staying in the family business
We now further investigate the question of when a subordinate will choose to stay to
remain in the family business. As discussed above, an agent will want to leave a cen-
tralized rm (to work in a decentralized non-family rm) for a lower range of parameter
values in a family than an non-family rm (^Fa < ^
NF
a ). Likewise, in a non-family
rm, decentralization will exist if and only if both parties prefer it; thus, in Figure (3),
the agent will leave a decentralized (non-family) rm in the region DE in favor of a
centralized (non-family) rm in J .
On the other hand, the parties need not agree about decentralization in a family rm.
In Figure (2), between ^Fa and ^
NF
a , an agent in a family rm would prefer it if the rm
were centralized. However, because he can only leave the rm and it is not within his
power to decide the structure of the rm, no outside option yields a higher payo for the
agent. Thus, in Figure (3), an agent in region BH will remain in the family rm even
though he would prefer the rm to be centralized; he will only leave the decentralized
family rm if a > ^
NF
a | that is, in regionD. This result is suggestive of several things.
First, an agent in a family rm could remain working there even if they would prefer
a dierent (centralized) decision-making allocation. While they remain working there,
such an agent would prefer to principal to take more responsibility for decision making,
allowing him to free ride on the principal's altruism. Hence our model demonstrates
a greater tendency to `stay put' in a family business than otherwise, which may help
explain the relative prevalence of family rms and blood-relations participation in them.
Even in the US, in which institutions protecting property-rights are well developed,
approximately one third of all large publicly-owned rms are owned and controlled by
founding families (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This discussion is summarized in the
result below.
Result 4. An agent could choose to remain in a decentralized family-owned even when
they would prefer decision making to be centralized.
Second, taken together, the results discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that
family rms exist for a broader range of parameters than non-family rms. Centralized
family rms exist in regions CEIJ whereas centralized non-family rms exist only in
J . Similarly, decentralized rms exist in regions ABC and ABFH for non-family and
family rms, respectively. Again, altruism allows for greater diversity of interest to exist
in equilibrium in family rms.
4.3 Choosing the type of work (a)
A similar result can be obtained by allowing an agent's congruence parameter to vary
between (non-family) rms. When this is possible, in Period 0, the level of a is a
choice variable for the agent if he opts to work for a non-family rm, reecting the fact
that there are many non-family rms but at most one family rm for each agent. One
interpretation of this is that an individual may nd work in a particular eld rewarding
(say, economics) and will have a high congruence parameter if his employer allows him
14
to work in that eld. If his family owns a business, that business may or may not allow
him to work in that eld, and an agent is unable to unilaterally change the nature of
the family business. However, if he seeks employment elsewhere, an agent can choose
amongst many rms in many dierent elds, each of which is associated with a dierent
a.
As noted above, the payo of an agent initially in a non-family or decentralized
family rm follows ADE in Figure (2). Such an agent maximizes his payo by choosing
a non-family rm with a = 1, which parallels the conventional wisdom that a person
is better o working for an organization if he shares or agrees with the goals and the
objectives of that organization. However, in Figure (4), an agent in a centralized family
rm will be better o staying in that rm than leaving for a rm where he has a higher
congruence parameter if a  a. This may explain the stylized fact that individuals
often stay in family businesses even if they are not that interested in the type of business
that their family conducts. This is summarized in the following proposition.
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Figure 4: Agent's payo under dierent organizational structures for xp = xa = 1, p = 0:5 and
 = 0:5. Above a, an agent can do no better than remaining in a centralized family rm.
Result 5. When an agent can choose to work for a (non-family) principal with similar
interests, the agent may still choose to stay a centralized family rm.
Both of these `stay-and-complain' results have alternative empirical predictions. The
rst is that an agent in a decentralized family rm might complain about having to do
too much (Result 4). However, an agent in centralized family rm { beneting from
the altruistic eorts of the principal { could well complain about the type of work that
the family business does (Result 5). Moreover, this model also suggests that transition
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between the generations in a family rm could be dicult. For instance, take the example
above in which an agent remains in a family rm, despite being able to choose to move to
a non-family rm doing work that is more interesting to them, here represented by their
congruence parameter (a  a). As shown in Figure (4), once the altruistic principal
leaves the operation, the decision-making rights will be allocated to the successor agent.
Thus, the payo to the agent-cum-principal will be given by the V Da , which is equal to
UDa and less than U
C
a . The successor will thus have an incentive to leave the family rm.
While our model deals with non-contractible payos, this is consistent with evidence of
the problems that arise in succession, and how the probability of failure increases with a
generational change in ownership. Our model suggests that without the benets arising
from their parent's altruistic (centralized) decision making, after succession the agent is
left running a rm they have relatively little interest in. It is also consistent with the
evidence of Bloom et al. (2012) that family-owned rms run by second-generation owners
are more likely to be poorly managed. Moreover, to the extent that nancial returns
are correlated to private payos, our prediction is consistent with the empirical ndings
that family successions have a negative causal impact on rm performance (Bennedsen
et al., 2007) and that while Japanese rms managed by founders trade at a premium, the
performance of family rms both owned and managed by descendants of the founder is
inferior to non-family rms (Saito, 2008). Furthermore, Saito (2008) found that family
rms, following succession, benet from a separation of ownership and control, in that
nancial performance is enhanced by employing an outside (non-family) professional
manager. This is consistent with our model; without the altruistic parent, the family
rm would benet from using a decision maker with a greater interest in what the rm
actually does. Finally, our model provides an empirical prediction that these issues of
succession are more likely to arise when decision-making is initially centralized, where
the agent has relatively little interest in the type of work the rm does.
Prediction 2. Relatively lower returns and performance of family rms following suc-
cession are more likely when decision-making was centralized prior to succession.
5 Concluding comments
We augment the model of Aghion & Tirole (1997) to include altruism between the
principal/owner in a family rm and the blood-related subordinate. Our framework
allows us to study the dierence between decision-making structures in family and non-
family organizations. In our model, the principal's altruism towards their blood-related
agent drives their dierent choices of decision-making allocation, eort and choice of
project. This suggests that further empirical investigation is required to tease out the
nuanced relationships between family ownership, decision-making authority, incentives
and protability.
When the agent's participation in a rm is exogenous, the centralization of decision
making is more likely if it is preferred by both the family-rm principal and agent. Again,
this result is driven by the principal's altruism: these conditions require the principal
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to be suciently altruistic towards the agent, such that the utility derived from the
increase in the agent's surplus outweighs the greater eort cost to the principal.
We also endogenize the subordinate's participation in the rm, in that we allow the
agent to be able to choose where they work. For simplicity we assume the agent has
all the bargaining power and can choose their preferred employer, be it in the family
rm or in an outside operation. However, once the agent has joined the rm, the
principal can choose the decision-making structure. This is consistent with the idea that
the principal cannot commit to a particular decision-making structure ex ante, so they
make that their choice ex post, after observing the characteristics of the agent. In this
setup, once equilibrium choices of both parties are taken into account, a wider range of
parameters support the existence of centralized decision making in family rms. This
result is consistent with the empirical ndings of Bloom et al. (2010) and Wait and
Wright (2010) that family-owned rms are more centralized than their non-family rm
counterparts.
Two `stay-and-complain' situations arise. An agent might choose to stay in a de-
centralized family rm, when they would prefer less authority { that is, they would
prefer the altruistic principal to make the decisions. In this case, the agent remains in
the family business, but might complain that they would prefer that things were done
dierently. On the other hand, we show that an agent might remain in a family rm,
even when there are non-family rms that provide a better match for their interests.
Again, it is the family principal's altruism that leads the agent to stay in with the fam-
ily business. But this agent, despite beneting from the principal's centralized decision
making, might express dissatisfaction with the type of work the family business does.
These issues crystallize when the issue of succession arises: without an altruistic princi-
pal to make decisions that favour the agent, the attractions of remaining in a business
they have relatively interest in might become somewhat diminished. At this point, the
agent-cum-principal may well choose to leave the family business in favour of non-family
business whose work better is of greater interest to them.
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Appendix
Proposition 1With endogenous participation by the agent and when the potential benet
of the project is the same to both parties, centralization is supported by a broader range
of parameters in a family-owned rm than in a non-family rm.
Proof:
1. Centralized rms exist for a wider range of parameter values in family rms than
in non-family rms for sure if ^Fp intersects ^
NF
p to the left of ^
NF
a .
2. If xp = xa = x, then e = e
 maximizes UCp and UDa .
3. At (^NFa ; ^
NF
p ), U
C
p (e
) = UDp (e) = UCa (e) = UDa (e).
4. If UCp (e
) = UCa (e), then:
V Cp (e
) =
1
1 + 
UCp (e
) +

1 + 
UCa (e
) = UCp (e
) = UCa (e
)
5. If UDp (e
) = UDa (e), then:
V Dp (e
) =
1
1 + 
UDp (e
) +

1 + 
UDa (e
) = UDp (e
) = UDa (e
)
6. Therefore, at (^NFa ; ^
NF
p ), V
C
p (e
) = V Dp (e).
7. But ep maximises V Cp . Therefore, at (^NFa ; ^NFp ), the principal must prefer cen-
tralization:
V Cp (e
) > V Cp (e
) = V Dp (e
)
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